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Abstract
We propose a method to generate audio adversarial
examples that can attack a state-of-the-art speech
recognition model in the physical world. Previous
work assumes that generated adversarial examples
are directly fed to the recognition model, and is
not able to perform such a physical attack because
of reverberation and noise from playback environ-
ments. In contrast, our method obtains robust ad-
versarial examples by simulating transformations
caused by playback or recording in the physical
world and incorporating the transformations into
the generation process. Evaluation and a listening
experiment demonstrated that our adversarial ex-
amples are able to attack without being noticed by
humans. This result suggests that audio adversarial
examples generated by the proposed method may
become a real threat.
1 Introduction
In recent years, deep learning has achieved vastly improved
accuracy, especially in fields such as image classification and
speech recognition, and has come to be used practically [Le-
Cun et al., 2015]. On the other hand, deep learning methods
are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples [Szegedy
et al., 2014,Goodfellow et al., 2015]. More specifically, an
attacker can make deep learning models misclassify examples
by intentionally adding a small perturbation to the examples.
Such examples are referred to as adversarial examples.
While many papers discussed image adversarial examples
against image classification models, little research has been
done on audio adversarial examples against speech recog-
nition models, even though speech recognition models are
widely used at present in commercial applications like Ama-
zon Alexa, Apple Siri, Google Assistant, and Microsoft Cor-
tana and devices like Amazon Echo and Google Home. For
example, [Carlini and Wagner, 2018] proposed a method
to generate audio adversarial examples against DeepSpeech
[Hannun et al., 2014], which is a state-of-the-art speech
recognition model. However, this method targets the case in
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which the waveform of the adversarial example is input di-
rectly to the model, as shown in Figure 1(A). In other words,
it is not feasible to attack in the case that the adversarial ex-
ample is played by a speaker and recorded by a microphone
in the physical world (hereinafter called the over-the-air con-
dition), as shown in Figure 1(B).
The difficulty of such an over-the-air attack can be at-
tributed to the reverberation of the environment and noise
from both the speaker and the microphone. More specifi-
cally, in the case of the direct input, adversarial examples can
be generated by determining a single data point that fools the
targeted model using an optimization algorithm for a clearly
described objective. In contrast, under the over-the-air con-
dition, adversarial examples are required to be robust against
unknown environments and equipment.
Considering that audio signals spread through the air, the
impact of a physical attack using audio adversarial examples
would be larger than that using image adversarial examples.
For an attack scenario using an image adversarial example,
the adversarial example must be presented explicitly in front
of an image sensor of the attack target, e.g., the camera of an
auto-driving car. In contrast, audio adversarial examples can
simultaneously attack numerous targets by spreading via out-
door speakers or radios. If an attacker hijacks the broadcast
equipment of a business complex, it will be possible to at-
tack all the smartphones owned by people inside via a single
playback of the audio adversarial example.
In the present paper, we propose a method by which to
generate a robust audio adversarial example that can attack
speech recognition models in the physical world. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first approach to succeed in gen-
erating such adversarial examples that can attack complex
speech recognition models based on recurrent networks, such
as DeepSpeech, over the air. Moreover, we believe that our
research will contribute to improving the robustness of speech
recognition models by training models to discriminate adver-
sarial examples through a process similar to adversarial train-
ing in the image domain [Goodfellow et al., 2015].
1.1 Related Research
Some studies have proposedmethods to generate audio adver-
sarial examples against speech recognition models [Alzantot
et al., 2018, Taori et al., 2018, Cisse´ et al., 2017, Scho¨nherr
et al., 2018, Carlini and Wagner, 2018]. These methods are
Figure 1: Illustration of the proposed attack. [Carlini and Wagner, 2018] assumed that adversarial examples are provided directly to the
recognition model. We propose a method that targets an over-the-air condition, which leads to a real threat.
divided into two groups: black-box and white-box settings.
In the black-box setting, in which the attacker can only use
the score that represents how close the input audio is to the
desired phrase, [Alzantot et al., 2018] proposed a method to
attack a speech command classification model [Sainath and
Parada, 2015]. This method exploits a genetic algorithm to
find an adversarial example, which is recognized as a speci-
fied command word. Inspired by this method, [Taori et al.,
2018] proposed a method to attack DeepSpeech [Hannun
et al., 2014] under the black-box setting by combining ge-
netic algorithms and gradient estimation. One limitation of
their method is that the length of the phrase that the attacker
can make the models recognize is restricted to two words
at most, even when the obtained adversarial example is di-
rectly inputted. [Cisse´ et al., 2017] performed an attack on
Google Voice application using adversarial examples gener-
ated against DeepSpeech-2 [Amodei et al., 2016]. The aim
of their attack was changing recognition results to different
words without being noticed by humans. In other words, they
could not make the targeted model output desired words and
concluded that attacking speech recognition models so as to
transcribe specified words “seem(s) to be much more chal-
lenging.” From these points, current methods in the black-
box settings are not realistic for considering the attack sce-
nario in the physical world.
In the white-box setting, in which the attacker can access
the parameters of the targeted models, [Yuan et al., 2018] pro-
posed a method to attack Kaldi [Povey et al., 2011], a conven-
tional speech recognition model based on the combination of
deep neural network and hidden Markov model. [Scho¨nherr
et al., 2018] extended the method such that generated ad-
versarial examples are not noticed by humans using a hiding
technique based on psychoacoustics. Although [Yuan et al.,
2018] succeeded in attacking over the air, their method is not
applicable to speech recognition models based on recurrent
networks, which are becomingmore popular and highly func-
tional. For example, Google replaced its conventional model
with a recurrent network based model in 20121.
In that respect, [Carlini and Wagner, 2018] proposed a
white-box method to attack against DeepSpeech, a recurrent
network based model. However, as mentioned previously,
this method succeeds in the case of the direct input, but not in
the over-the-air condition, because of the reverberation of the
1https://ai.googleblog.com/2015/08/the-neural-networks-
behind-google-voice.html
environment and noise from both the speaker and the micro-
phone. Thus, the threat of the obtained adversarial example
is limited regarding the attack scenario in the physical world.
1.2 Contribution
The contribution of the present paper is two-fold:
• We propose a method by which to generate audio ad-
versarial examples that can attack speech recognition
models based on recurrent networks under the over-the-
air condition. Note that such a practical attack is not
achievable using the conventional methods described in
Section 1.1. We addressed the problem of the reverber-
ation and the noise in the physical world by simulating
them and incorporating the simulated influence into the
generation process.
• We show the feasibility of the practical attack using the
adversarial examples generated by the proposed method
in evaluation and a listening experiment. Specifically,
the generated adversarial examples demonstrated a suc-
cess rate of 100% for the attack through both speakers
and radio broadcasting, although no participants heard
the target phrase in the listening experiment.
2 Background
In this section, we briefly introduce an adversarial example
and review current speech recognition models.
2.1 Adversarial Example
An adversarial example is defined as follows. Given a trained
classification model f : Rn → {1, 2, · · · , k} and an input
sample x ∈ Rn, an attacker wishes to modify x so that
the model recognizes the sample as having a specified label
l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} and the modification does not change the
sample significantly:
x˜ ∈ Rn s.t. f (x˜) = l ∧ ‖x− x˜‖ ≤ δ (1)
Here, δ is a parameter that limits the magnitude of perturba-
tion added to the input sample and is introduced so that hu-
mans cannot notice the difference between a legitimate input
sample and an input sample modified by an attacker.
Let v = x˜−x be the perturbation. Then, adversarial exam-
ples that satisfy Equation 1 can be found by optimizing this
in which Lossf is a loss function that represents how distant
the input data are from the given label under the model f :
argmin
v
Loss
f
(x+ v, l) + ǫ ‖v‖ (2)
By solving the problem using optimization algorithms, the at-
tacker can obtain an adversarial example. In particular, when
f is a differentiable model, such as a regular neural network,
and a gradient on v can be calculated, a gradient method such
as Adam [Kingma and Ba, 2015] is often used.
2.2 Image Adversarial Example for a Physical
Attack
Considering attacks on physical recognition devices (e.g., ob-
ject recognition of auto-driving cars), adversarial examples
are given to the model through sensors. In the example of
the auto-driving car, image adversarial examples are given
to the model after being printed on physical materials and
photographed by a car-mounted camera. Through such a
process, the adversarial examples are transformed and ex-
posed to noise. However, adversarial examples generated by
Equation 2 are assumed to be given directly to the model and
do not work for such scenarios.
In order to address this problem, [Athalye et al., 2018] pro-
posed a method to simulate transformations caused by print-
ing or taking a picture and incorporate the transformations
into the generation process of image adversarial examples.
This method can be represented as follows using a set of
transformations T consisting of, e.g., enlargement, reduction,
rotation, change in brightness, and addition of noise:
argmin
v
Et∼T
[
Loss
f
(t (x+ v), l)
+ ǫ ‖t (x)− t (x+ v)‖] (3)
As a result, adversarial examples are generated so that images
work even after being printed and photographed.
2.3 Audio Adversarial Example
As explained in Section 1.1, [Carlini and Wagner, 2018] suc-
ceeded to attack against DeepSpeech, a recurrent network
based model. Here, the targeted model has time-dependency
and the same approach as image adversarial examples is not
applicable. Thus, based on the fact that the targeted model
uses Mel-Frequency Cepstrum Coefficient (MFCC) for the
feature extraction, they implemented MFCC calculation in a
differentiable manner and optimized an entire waveform us-
ing Adam [Kingma and Ba, 2015].
In detail, the perturbation v is obtained against the input
sample x and the target phrase l using the loss function of
DeepSpeech as follows:
argmin
v
Loss
f
(MFCC (x+ v), l) + ǫ ‖v‖ (4)
Here,MFCC (x+ v) represents the MFCC extraction from
the waveform of x + v. They reported the success rate of
the obtained adversarial examples as 100% when inputting
waveforms directly into the recognition model, but did not
succeed at all under the over-the-air condition.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no proposal to
generate audio adversarial examples, which work under the
over-the-air condition, targeting speech recognition models
using a recurrent network.
3 Proposed Method
In this research, we propose a method by which to generate a
robust adversarial example that can attack DeepSpeech [Han-
nun et al., 2014] under the over-the-air condition. The basic
idea is to incorporate transformations caused by playback and
recording into the generation process, similar to [Athalye et
al., 2018]. We introduce three techniques: a band-pass filter,
impulse response, and white Gaussian noise.
3.1 Band-pass Filter
Since the audible range of humans is 20 to 20,000 Hz, nor-
mal speakers are not made to play sounds outside this range.
Moreover, microphones are often made to automatically cut
out all but the audible range in order to reduce noise. There-
fore, if the obtained perturbation is outside the audible range,
the perturbation will be cut during playback and recording
and will not function as an adversarial example.
Therefore, we introduced a band-pass filter in order to ex-
plicitly limit the frequency range of the perturbation. Based
on empirical observations, we set the band to 1,000 to 4,000
Hz, which exhibited less distortion. Here, the generation pro-
cess is represented as follows based on Equation 4:
argmin
v
Loss
f
(MFCC (x˜), l) + ǫ ‖v‖
where x˜ = x+ BPF
1000∼4000Hz
(v) (5)
In this way, it is expected that the generated adversarial ex-
amples will acquire robustness such that they function even
when frequency bands outside the audible range are cut by a
speaker or a microphone.
3.2 Impulse Response
Impulse response is the reaction obtained when presented
with a brief input signal, called an impulse. Based on the
fact that impulse responses can reproduce the reverberation in
the captured environment by convolution, a method of using
impulse responses from various environments in the training
of a speech recognition model to enhance the robustness to
the reverberation has been proposed [Peddinti et al., 2015].
Similarly, we introduced impulse responses to the generation
process in order to make the obtained adversarial example ro-
bust to reverberations.
In addition, considering the scenario of attacking numer-
ous devices at once via outdoor speakers or radios, we want
the obtained adversarial example to work in various environ-
ments. Therefore, in the same manner as [Athalye et al.,
2018], we take an expectation value over impulse responses
recorded in diverse environments. Here, Equation 5 is ex-
tended like Equation 3, where the set of collected impulse re-
sponses isH and the convolution using impulse response h is
Convh:
argmin
v
Eh∼H
[
Loss
f
(MFCC (x˜), l) + ǫ ‖v‖
]
where x¯ = Conv
h
(
x+ BPF
1000∼4000Hz
(v)
)
(6)
In this way, it is expected that the generated adversarial ex-
amples will acquire robustness such that they are not affected
by reverberations produced in the environment in which they
are played and recorded.
3.3 White Gaussian Noise
White Gaussian noise is given byN
(
0, σ2
)
and used for em-
ulating the effect of many random processes that occur in
nature. For example, it is used in the evaluation of speech
recognition models to measure their robustness against the
background noise [Hansen and Pellom, 1998]. Consequently,
we introduce white Gaussian noise in the generation process
in order to make the obtained adversarial example robust to
background noise. Here, Equation 6 is extended as follows:
argmin
v
Eh∼H,w∼N (0,σ2)
[
Loss
f
(MFCC (x˜), l) + ǫ ‖v‖
]
where x¯ = Conv
h
(
x+ BPF
1000∼4000Hz
(v)
)
+w (7)
In this way, it is expected that the generated adversarial ex-
amples will acquire robustness such that they are not affected
by noise caused by recording equipment and the environ-
ment. Note that the white Gaussian noise should also be
added before the convolution for the purpose of emulating
thermal noise caused in both the playback and recording de-
vices. However, we added the noise only after the convo-
lution because doing so makes the optimization easier and
Equation 7 was sufficiently robust in the empirical observa-
tions.
4 Evaluation
In order to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed method,
we conducted evaluation experiments. We played and
recorded audio adversarial examples generated by the pro-
posed method and verified whether these adversarial exam-
ples are recognized as target phrases.
4.1 Implementation
We implemented Equation 7 using TensorFlow2. Since cal-
culating the expected value of the loss is difficult, we instead
evaluated the sample approximation of Equation 7 with re-
spect to a fixed number of impulse responses sampled ran-
domly from H. For optimization, we used Adam [Kingma
and Ba, 2015] in the same manner as [Carlini and Wagner,
2018].
2Our full implementation is available at https://github.com/
hiromu/robust audio ae
Figure 2: Two attack situations of the evaluation: speaker and ra-
tio. In the first situation, the adversarial examples were played and
recorded by a speaker and a microphone. In the second situation, the
adversarial examples were broadcasted using an FM radio.
4.2 Settings
For the input sample x, we prepared two different audio clips
of four seconds cut from Cello Suite No. 1 by Bach and To
The Sky by Owl City. The first clip is the same as the publicly
released samples3 of [Carlini and Wagner, 2018]. The second
clip is the same as the publicly released samples4 of [Yuan et
al., 2018]. The difference between the clips is that the first
clip is an instrumental piece and does not include singing
voices, whereas singing voices are included in the second
song by Owl City.
For the target phrase l, we prepared three different cases:
“hello world,” “open the door5,” and “ok google6.” Con-
sidering that [Carlini and Wagner, 2018] tested their method
with 1,000 phrases that were randomly chosen from a speech
dataset, three phrases appear to be insufficient to evaluate the
efficiency of our attack. However, unlike the direct attack
as performed by [Carlini and Wagner, 2018], our evaluation
involves a number of playback cycles in the physical world.
This means that our experimental evaluation in the over-the-
air setting requires actual time for playing back the generated
audio adversarial examples. For example, our evaluation of a
single combination of the input sample and the target phrase
requires more than 18 hours in a quiet room without interrup-
tion because it involves playing 500 intermediate examples
10 times each with an interval of several seconds. For this
reason, we focused on these three phrases considering the at-
tack scenarios.
For the set of impulse responses H, we collected 615
impulse responses from various databases [Kinoshita et al.,
2013, Nakamura et al., 2000, Jeub et al., 2009,Wen et al.,
2006, Ha¨rma¨, 2001], which are constructed primarily for re-
search on dereverberation.
For the playback and the recording, we prepared two differ-
ent attack situations, as shown in Figure 2, in order to confirm
that the attack using the generated adversarial examples is ap-
plicable via a wide range of offensive means. First, we played
and recorded the adversarial examples using a speaker and a
microphone (JBL CLIP2 / Sony ECM-PCV80U) in a meet-
3https://nicholas.carlini.com/code/audio adversarial examples/
4https://sites.google.com/view/commandersong/
5This phrase is used in [Yuan et al., 2018] to discuss an attack
scenario using voice commands.
6This phrase is used as a trigger word of Google Home.
Input sample Target phrase SNR
(A) Bach hello world 9.3dB
(B) Bach open the door 5.3dB
(C) Bach ok google 0.2dB
(D) Owl City hello world 11.8dB
(E) Owl City open the door 13.4dB
(F) Owl City ok google 2.6dB
Table 1: Details of the generated audio adversarial examples, which
showed 100% success by both the speaker and the radio and having
the maximum value of SNR8.
ing room with a distance of approximately 0.5 meters. We
also examined whether the generated adversarial examples
could attack through the radio using HackRF One7, a Soft-
ware Defined Radio (SDR) capable of transmission or recep-
tion of radio signals. We broadcasted at 180.0MHz FM and
received the signal with a portable radio (Sony ICF-P36) in
the same room, while the playback was recorded by a micro-
phone (Sony ECM-PCV80U). In both cases, we played each
adversarial example 10 times to suppress random fluctuation
in the physical world and evaluated the recognition results
obtained by DeepSpeech.
4.3 Metrics
For the evaluation metrics of the obtained adversarial exam-
ple, we used the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the perturba-
tion, the success rate of the attack, and the edit distance of the
recognition results. The SNR is given by 10 log10
Px
Pv
for the
power of the input sample Px =
1
T
∑T
t=1 x
2
t and the power
of perturbation Pv =
1
T
∑T
t=1 v
2
t . In other words, a larger
SNR is associated with a smaller perturbation and a smaller
likelihood for a human to notice.
The success rate of the attack is the ratio of the number of
times that DeepSpeech transcribed the recorded adversarial
example as the target phrase among all trials. The success rate
becomes non-zero only when DeepSpeech transcribes adver-
sarial examples as the target phrase perfectly.
Thus, we also introduced the edit distance between the
recognition results and the target phrase to confirm the
progress of the generation process. The edit distance reveals
the progressmore precisely, evenwhen the success rate is 0%.
Here, the edit distance is defined as the minimum number of
procedures required to transform one string into the other by
inserting, deleting, and replacing one character.
4.4 Results
The progress of the generation process is presented in
Figure 3. The figure shows that, as the generation progresses,
the SNR decreases and the edit distance of the recognition re-
sults to the target phrase also decreases. The detailed results
of the generated adversarial examples showed certain levels
of the success rate are presented in Table 1.
7https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/
8These audio files are available at https://yumetaro.info/projects/
audio-ae/.
Input Target
SNR
Attack Success Edit
sample phrase situation rate dist.
(G) Bach
hello
world 11.9dB
Speaker 60% 1.1
Radio 50% 1.3
(H) Bach
open
the door 6.6dB
Speaker 60% 1.8
Radio 60% 1.8
(I) Bach
ok
google
4.2dB
Speaker 80% 0.6
Radio 70% 0.9
(J)
Owl
City
hello
world
12.2dB
Speaker 70% 0.9
Radio 50% 1.5
(K)
Owl
City
open
the door 14.6dB
Speaker 90% 0.2
Radio 100% 0.0
(L)
Owl
City
ok
google
8.7dB
Speaker 90% 0.6
Radio 70% 0.9
Table 2: Details of the generated audio adversarial examples, which
showed at least 50% success by both the speaker and the radio and
having the maximum value of SNR8.
As shown in Table 1, in all combinations of the input sam-
ple and the target phrase, the proposed method generated ad-
versarial examples that showed 100% success by both the
speaker and the radio. On the other hand, the magnitude of
the perturbation required to achieve 100% success differed
depending on the input sample and the target phrase. In the
previous method [Yuan et al., 2018] targeted at Kaldi [Povey
et al., 2011] under the over-the-air condition, an SNR of less
than 2.0 dB was reported in all cases. In other words, con-
sidering that (D) through (F) of Table 1 use the same input
sample, the proposed method is able to generate an adversar-
ial example with less perturbation while targeted at a more
complex speech recognition model.
Table 2 showed the adversarial examples having a success
rate of at least 50% by both the speaker and the radio with
the maximum value of SNR. We found that much less per-
turbation was required to achieve a success rate of 50%, as
compared to Table 1, in all cases. In other words, the attack
using these adversarial examples will succeed once in two at-
tempts and can be a major threat when the attacker allows
uncertainty of the attack.
In all cases in Table 1 and Table 2, the adversarial exam-
ples generated with Bach’s Cello Suite No. 1 have larger SNR
compared to the case of Owl City. This result supports the
discussion of [Yuan et al., 2018], whereby some phonemes
from singing voices in the input sample work together with
the injected small perturbations to form the target phrases.
Considering such an effect, we can determine that the result
is due to the song by Owl City having more phonemes to help
form the target phrases, as compared to Bach’s instrumental
piece, and requires less perturbation.
We also found that the recognition results of the adversarial
examples in Table 2 changed only slightly between the cases
of the speaker and the radio. This result suggests that the
proposed method makes the generated adversarial example
robust for FM transmission also. For example, the addition
of white Gaussian noise in the proposed method would also
work for the noise caused by FM transmission. Moreover,
as mentioned in Section 1, one of the major concerns of an
Figure 3: Progress of the generation process of the adversarial examples. As the generation progresses, the SNR and the edit distance in the
speaker situation decreases. The detailed results of the highlighted adversarial examples are shown in Table 1 and Table 2.
Used techniques Input sample
Band-pass Impulse Gaussian
Bach
Owl
filter response noise City
– –
✓ – –
✓ – –
✓ – –
✓ ✓ – –
✓ ✓ −4.2dB −3.8dB
✓ ✓ – –
✓ ✓ ✓ 9.3dB9 11.8dB9
Table 3: Results of switching in the presence of each technique.
Only the case of combining the band-pass filter and white Gaussian
noise succeeded to generate, though it requires much more pertur-
bation than the case of Table 1.
audio adversarial example is that it can attack numerous tar-
gets simultaneously. In this respect, the success of the attack
through the radio might have a significant impact because
such an attack can be made without making victims play an
adversarial example actively on their own.
4.5 Effect of Each Technique
We then investigated the individual effect of the three tech-
niques on the success of the proposed method. In detail, we
evaluated the effect of the three techniques with changing the
combinations in the generation. Once we obtained an adver-
sarial example that is recognized as the target phrase using
the speaker in a similar environment as Section 4.2, we com-
pared its SNR in Table 1. Here, we used “hello world” as the
targeted phrase because it is suggested to be relatively easy to
generate according to Table 1.
The results are shown in Table 3. We note that the gen-
eration without any of the proposed techniques is equivalent
to [Carlini and Wagner, 2018]. Here, all the cases except the
9These values are from Table 1.
ok google turn off open the door happy birthday
good night call john hello world airplane mode on
Table 4: List of choices presented to participants in the listening
experiments. We chose simple phrases of lengths similar to those of
“hello world” or “open the door,” concentrating on phrases that are
used as voice commands.
combination of the band-pass filter and white Gaussian noise
could not generate adversarial examples that can attack under
the over-the-air condition. In addition, the succeeded combi-
nation requires muchmore perturbation than the case of using
all the three techniques.
From these results, it is suggested that we can generate ad-
versarial examples that work over the air without the help
of the impulse responses by using white Gaussian noise,
whereas the band-pass filter seems to be essential consider-
ing the limitation of physical devices. At the same time, the
impulse responses are considered to make adversarial exam-
ples robust specifically for reverberations, which results in the
reduction of the perturbation, as discussed in Section 3.2.
5 Listening Experiment
In order to consider an attack scenario using the generated ad-
versarial examples, whether humans can notice is important.
If an attacker can make intended phrases to be recognized
without it being noticed by humans, then an attack exploiting
speech recognition devices will be possible.
For example, [Yuan et al., 2018] conducted listening ex-
periments using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) in the pro-
posal of the attack for Kaldi [Povey et al., 2011]. As a result,
they reported that only 2.2% of the participants realized that
the lyrics had changed from the original songs used as in-
put samples, whereas approximately 65% noticed abnormal
noises in the generated adversarial examples.
We similarly conducted listening experiments using AMT
in order to confirm whether humans notice an attack.
Hear Hear With presentation of
anything a target the choices listed in Table 4
abnormal phrase Correct Incorrect Not sure
(A) 36.0% 0.0% 4.0% 28.0% 68.0%
(B) 56.0% 0.0% 4.0% 32.0% 64.0%
(C) 48.0% 0.0% 4.0% 24.0% 72.0%
(D) 32.0% 0.0% 4.0% 28.0% 68.0%
(E) 44.0% 0.0% 8.0% 16.0% 76.0%
(F) 48.0% 0.0% 0.0% 32.0% 68.0%
Table 5: Results of the listening experiments of Table 1. Although a
certain number of participants felt abnormal, most of the participants
could not hear the target phrases, even when presented with choices.
5.1 Settings
We used the six generated adversarial examples (A) through
(F) of Table 1, which were recognized as target phrases with
a success rate of 100%. We conducted an online survey sepa-
rately for each adversarial examplewith 25 participants. They
listened to the adversarial example three times, and, after each
listening, we asked each of the following questions:
1. Did you hear anything abnormal? (For affirmative re-
sponses, we asked them to write what they felt.)
2. (With the disclosure that some voice is included) did you
hear any words? (For affirmative responses, we asked
them to write down the words.)
3. (With the presentation of eight phrases in Table 4) which
phrase do you believe was included?
5.2 Results
The results are shown in Table 5. Although a certain num-
ber of participants felt abnormal, no one could hear the target
phrases in all cases.
In detail, for example, only 32% of the participants felt
abnormal about Table 5(D) and provided comments like, “It
was not very clear,” ”The music seemed a bit fuzzy,” and “It
sounded like birds in the background.” Although Table 5(B)
showed the highest rate of the participants feeling abnormal,
only comments similar to (D), such as, “It was like hearing
over a bad Skype connection or phone call,” were provided.
For (D) through (F) of Table 5, which are generated on the
song by Owl City, we found more comments related to the
sound quality, such as, “It sounds highly compressed,” com-
pared to the case of Bach’s Cello Suite. However, an indi-
cation of any messages or utterances was not available in all
cases.
Furthermore, even when presented with choices for the tar-
get phrases, more than half of the participants responded, “I
could not catch anything.” In particular, no one could choose
the correct choice, even though seven participants chose the
incorrect choices for Table 5(F). Moreover, in the other five
adversarial examples, only one or two participants chose the
target phrase correctly. Note that these results were obtained
under the condition in which we explicitly instructed the par-
ticipants to listen for the adversarial examples and presented
them with choices for the target phrases. Thus, we believe
this result does not deter the attack scenario, which usually
seeks a situation that is less likely to be noticed.
Based on the above considerations, we conclude that the
generated adversarial examples sound like mere noise and are
almost unnoticeable to humans, which can be a real threat. In
addition, the obtained comments suggest directions for fu-
ture investigation of attack scenarios. For example, we might
able to use birdsong as the input samples or play the sam-
ples through a telephone to make adversarial examples more
difficult to notice.
6 Conclusion
In this research, we proposed a method by which to gener-
ate audio adversarial example targeting the state-of-the-art
speech recognition model that can attack practically in the
physical world. We were able to generate such robust adver-
sarial examples by introducing a band-pass filter, impulse re-
sponse, and white Gaussian noise to the generation process in
order to simulate the transformations caused by the over-the-
air playback. In the evaluation, we confirmed that the adver-
sarial examples generated by the proposed method can have
smaller perturbations than the conventional method, which
cannot deal with recurrent networks. Moreover, the results of
listening experiments confirmed that the obtained adversar-
ial examples are almost unnoticeable to humans. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first approach to successfully
generate audio adversarial examples for speech recognition
models that use a recurrent network in the physical world.
In the future, we would like to examine a detailed attack
scenario and possible defense methods regarding the gener-
ated audio adversarial examples. We would also like to con-
sider the possibility of realizing a robust speech recognition
model using adversarial training, as discussed for the image
classification [Goodfellow et al., 2015].
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